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It is "the sentiment of this relation between the moral being and the law which governs him. For this it is not necessary to believe in God in the traditional sense of the word." Later in the work he says, with doubtful consistency, that the highest stage of religion is reached when God is revealed, not as a power or as law, but as love ; religion then also takes the form of love (p. 374).

The relation of theology to the religious sentiment is discussed at some length. Faith precedes theology. The moral and intellectual elements in the act of faith are organically connected, yet the priority of the moral factor is insisted on. Pure abstract logic says that one must know before he can adore, historical psychology shows that in the first instance one desires, prays, adores, and thus comes to know, and that the definition of the object of adoration is drawn from the worship offered to it and the benefit expected from it (p. 353). Again: "It is by good right that Christians say that faith, the earliest manifestation of the life of the soul, comes from the immanent action of God. Man, therefore, receives life but makes his own belief." The character of this intellectual work is "always and necessarily subjective and contingent."

Theology can become scientific by adopting the method of observation and experiment, and by choosing for itself, as the other sciences have done, a well-defined field of study. The "section of reality which it is the duty of theology to study is the religious phenomenon in general and the Christian phenomenon in particular" (p. 348). "Theology, therefore, has two sources, psychology and history." It knows "no sources of information" beyond these.

There seems no place for philosophy or dogmatics. Yet it is said in another passage that dogmas are to be made intelligible and respectable (p. 358) ; and when it is added that account must be taken of the experimental knowledge of the universe gained by astronomy, geology, etc. (p. 361), there seems to be demanded, not a mere analysis of the religious sentiment, but a systematic philosophy.

Sabatier's initial error is in separating religion from cognition. Prayer, adoration, without some recognition of an object, is unintelligible. As religion means a conscious relation to an object, it is necessary it should know that object, or have a philosophy of it. The religious life may depend on other factors than philosophical cognition. But this cognition is, at least, one factor, and till it is fully attained, religion cannot reach its highest form.

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L'unité dans l'être vivant (Essai d'une biologie chimique). Par FÉLIX LE DANTEC. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1902.—pp. viii, 412.

Without attempting an exposition of the work as a whole, we may indicate certain chapters whose problems are of historic interest, such as the numerous ones dealing with the definition of the individual organism and the species.

The author takes it to be a general principle of all classification, that "the definition of the species is qualitative, and the determination of the individual is quantitative" (p. 88). The analysis is not sufficiently close to enable one to say how the author would define the distinction between qualitative and quantitative relations; the important result for biological classification is that identity of chemical constituents is sufficient to establish qualitative likeness, while the proportions in which constituents enter give quantitative differences. There is, then, a common chemical quality in all individuals of the same species, with quantitative coefficients defining the individual (pp. 88 ff.).

Observe the place accorded to the fundamental variations that biology is obliged to recognize: variation of tissue, variation of individuality, variation of species. Imagine, namely, the chemical substances a, b . . . to enter with coefficients α, β, . . . into groups, and these in turn to enter, with coefficients λ, μ, . . . into the cell composition. The species of the organism is defined by a, b . . . ; the individuality by α, β . . . which at any moment are the same in all the groups and all the cells of a single organism. The tissues are defined by the factors λ, μ, . . . which have one set of values in the blood, another in the muscles, etc. (Chap. x).

On what factors do these variations depend? The variation of tissue must be conceived as a physico-chemical reaction of the embryo to its environment. It is conceivable, however, that this environment might so affect an organism as to alter its coefficients of individuality. As these are common to all the cells, the supposition requires that the reproductive cells be modified along with the others; a hypothetical basis for the inheritance of acquired characteristics is thus provided (pp. 57 ff., 150 ff.). Another way in which the coefficients of individuality are modified in offspring is through the composition of the factors belonging to true parent organisms (p. 68).

Are we, finally, to conceive these factors which modify the individual in a quantitative way as effecting, in time, a qualitative change, *i.e.*, variaation of species? On this point the author is far from clear. For while admitting the possibility of such transformation (p. 100), while forced indeed to admit its actuality or else to deny common ancestry to different species, it would appear that all his studies of particular cases of transformation are within the species, *i. e.*, involve the quantitative coefficients only (pp. 149 ff.).

We may compare this chemical basis of definition with others. How, for example, do the tissues, individuals, species defined chemically, correspond to those of the usual morphological definitions? The correspondence is complete; for the form of an organism being nothing but its configuration of equilibrium in a given medium, and this being dependent on its chemical composition, there must be just as many morphological as chemical differences between organisms. In particular, it is the *inheritable* form of equilibrium that is the best test for the coefficients of individuality, — it is this which enables us to distinguish a true individual from a colony (pp. 131 ff.). Finally, this chemical principle of classification yields the same result as the genetic, now commonly adopted. After a skilful display of the difficulties attending the reconstruction of family trees on the data of morphological resemblances, the author points out that the usual method of evading these difficulties depends on an unprovable assumption, to wit, that proximity of kinship is determined by the lateness of the stage at which the embryos develop differences. If we seek a basis of qualification that is free from this hypothetical factor, it must be found in the chemical. On this basis we can understand that those cells which have the greatest chemical analogy will be the last in the process of multiplication to develop noticeable morphological differences. The embryological method would still be the only practicable one, but it would stand for a delicate test of chemical likeness and difference, not relevantly, for a criterion of kinship (Chap. xv).

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Vers le positivisme absolu par l'idealisme. Par LOUIS WEBER. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1903.—pp. 396.

The main thesis of M. Weber's book is one which is familiar in recent philosophy. It represents the thoroughgoing repudiation of realism and ontology in all its forms. On the critical side, it has not indeed much to say that is particularly new; and while the arguments are acutely put, they have the defect, not uncommon in the particular type of thinking which they represent, that their force depends largely on having already accepted presuppositions which involve the point at issue. Nevertheless, the book is of considerable significance. Its grasp of principles and its clear-cut logic are admirable; and where it does not convince, it will at least make clearer some of the issues.

The main drift of the argument is indicated by the title. Historically, Positivism tends to regard reflective thought as sterile, and objective experience as the only valid source of knowledge. Is this opposition necessary? Or may not rather idealistic reflection be required to give a basis to Positivism such as empiricism is unable to give? The necessity for this basis the first chapter tries to show by retracing the story of modern empirical idealism. Reflective thought has, in the first place, undermined completely common sense realism. But the realism which science attempts to substitute is equally untenable. Full of self-contradictions, and incapable of being conceived positively save in psychical terms, the concepts of science are plainly not to be regarded as entities. Or, if we take their objects as unknowable, we simply have, in Agnosticism, a new and nebulous ontology, equally infected with the vice of realism. But now, while the outcome of science is thus idealistic, this idealism, if taken dogmatically, would mean